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ABSTRACT
Seelam, Venkata Naga Siva. M.S., Department of Computer Science and Engineering,
Wright State University, 2017. Settings Protection Add-on: A User-Interactive Browser
Extension to Prevent the Exploitation of Preferences.

The abuse of browser preferences is a significant application security issue, despite
numerous protections against automated software changing these preferences. Browser
hijackers modify user’s desired preferences by injecting malicious software into the
browser. Users are not aware of these modifications, and the unwanted changes can annoy
the user and circumvent security preferences. Reverting these changes is not easy, and users
often have to go through complicated sequences of steps to restore their preferences to the
previous values. Tasks to resolve this issue include uninstalling and re-installing the
browser, resetting browser preferences, and installing malware removal tools. This thesis
describes a solution to this problem by developing a user-interactive browser add-on named
“Settings Protection.”
This thesis describes the various means of exploiting preferences in the Google
Chrome and Mozilla Firefox browsers and discusses preferences that are frequently
exploited by browser hijackers. The Settings Protection add-on observes and detects
changes in preferences that users may be unaware of. After detecting these unknown
changes, the add-on reverts the modified preferences to old values and saves the new
changes upon the user’s confirmation. If the user is not expecting these changes in the
browser, the add-on discards them. A proof of concept add-on for the Mozilla Firefox
iii

browser implements this research and is tested in a real-time environment. Lastly, this
thesis evaluates the performance of the Settings Protection add-on using the Mozilla
Firefox performance tools.
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1.

Introduction

Browser Hijacking
Browser hijacking is a type of attack in which the attacker tries to modify the
normal operation of a web browser. The attackers change the behavior of the web browser
through modifying the preferences. Browser hijackers mainly target the preferences such
as default search engine, homepage, and new tab page URL. They also modify the browser
security preferences to a lower level of security. By disabling the security preferences, it
would be easier for them to take the user to websites of malicious content and
advertisement pages.

Various ways of Exploiting Browser Preferences
The malicious software exploiting preferences enter the browser in many ways
including installing an add-on, tricking users to click on pop-ups, malicious software
bundled with free software, and Drive-by Download. In the following sections, this thesis
explains each of them in detail.

1

1.2.1. Browser Add-ons
A browser add-on is a piece of software, which extends the functionality of the
browser. The second chapter provides a detailed explanation of the concepts about the addon system and add-on architecture. Consider a scenario where a user tries to install a
browser add-on. When the user installs a browser add-on for a specific purpose, the addon may change the preferences of the browser without the user’s notice apart from its
normal desired operation.
For example, the user is looking for an add-on to block advertisements. The user
will look for different add-ons available in the official Mozilla add-on store. Based on the
add-on description, the user will find an add-on from the available list of add-ons suitable
to his requirements. The user installs the add-on in the browser hoping that it will serve a
specific purpose as per his needs. However, the installed add-on may perform additional
operations on the browser preferences where a developer may not disclose these additional
functionalities in the add-on description. If the user comes across such type of add-on, some
browser preferences modification happens without the user’s notice. Users unknowingly
install these types of add-ons, which make undesired changes to preferences. Browser
hijackers make use of this path to deploy malicious add-ons available in the market.

1.2.2. Advertisement Pop-ups
An advertisement pop-up is a browser window displaying random advertisements.
Some websites create a lot of pop-ups with advertisements and trick users to click them.
These pop-ups include redirecting to random advertisement pages, the opening of new
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advertisement windows, and fake anti-virus software advertisements. In these pop-ups and
advertisement pages, browser hijackers will open add-on installation pop-ups. In the
process of closing these pop-ups and advertisement pages, users may agree to installation
of the malicious add-ons. These undesired add-ons in the browser might modify
preferences without the user’s permission.

1.2.3. Drive-by Download
A drive-by download is a process, in which clicking on advertisements pages leads
to download of malignant codes into the browser. Some websites open new advertisement
windows and occupy the whole desktop screen. These advertisements may contain
malware that is harmful to the user’s system. In some cases, when the user clicks on such
malicious advertisements, the browser window downloads malignant codes. These codes
change browser behavior causing redirection to malicious websites and modifying the
browser preferences. These redirecting websites include some fake antivirus pages which
prompt the user to install antivirus software. In other cases, the hijackers share malicious
website links through email and make users click them.

1.2.4. Freeware Software
Malicious code bundled with free software is one of the primary sources for
browser hijacking. While installing free software, users may unknowingly accept to
additional downloads, which include malicious add-ons and software. Hijackers will trick
average users intentionally to install the malicious codes along with the main software. If
the user skips on unselecting the additional downloads, then it leads to installation of other
3

unwanted malware programs. Moreover, browser hijackers do not mention enough details
or description about the extra software attached. This additional software disturbs the user’s
surfing experience by modifying the browser preferences and creating a lot of
advertisements.

Figure 1. Recommendations Provided by Java Software

For instance, when installing the Java software downloaded from the official
ORACLE website, the installation process recommends some suggestions. These
recommendations include a change of the search engine and homepage URL to the Yahoo
search engine and homepage. Figure 1 shows these recommendations. The Java installation
process provides an option to de-select the installation of unwanted pieces of software.
While clicking on the “next” button continuously in the installation process, there is a
4

chance that an average user misses the de-selection of undesired pieces of software. It leads
to modifications in the browser preferences such as changes in the homepage URL and
changes in the default search engine.

Significance of the Browser Hijacking
Browser hijackers exploit browser preferences mainly for the benefits gained
indirectly. The benefits may include obtaining revenue through advertisements and
increasing the number of downloads for a specific software. The modified values of the
preferences search engine and homepage directs the user browsing window to an
organization’s web page thus, increasing the page visits to that organization’s web page.
This process benefits both the browser hijackers and the third parties at the cost of the end
users surfing experience.
Another important consequence of the browser hijacking is that the user needs to
spend additional time in browsing. For instance, consider a case where hijackers change
the preference search engine. Now, the user searches for something in the browser URL
bar assuming that the default search engine in the browser is his desired value. Whereas,
the user obtains the unexpected results from the modified search engine. To obtain the
desired results, the user again should search on the web page of the old search engine. This
rework in navigating across search engines would affect the user’s browsing time.

5

Scope
This thesis seeks to provide a user interactive solution to prevent browser
preference exploitation. This research focuses only on the browser preferences and does
not consider other issues in browser hijacking such as the redirection to new web pages
and random advertising pages. This research implements the solution by developing a
browser add-on called “Settings Protection,” in the range of add-on capabilities to handle
the modifications in preferences. Considering all the above aspects, the intent of this
research is to discover answers to the below questions:
Q1: In what ways, can browser preferences be exploited through browser hijacking? What
preferences are targeted in browser hijacking?
Q2: Can a browser add-on be effective in defending the browser preferences exploitation?
Q3: How does our browser add-on performs and analyzes its functionality using browser
performance tools provided by Mozilla Firefox.

Thesis Overview
Throughout this document, the word “hijacker” refers to a person who makes the
attacks browser hijacking. In web browser terminology “settings” and “preferences” are
synonyms and this document uses the word “preference”. Chapter one briefly discusses the
concept of browser hijacking and the various ways of exploiting preferences using browser
hijacking. This chapter further provides the significance of the browser hijacking issue and
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its impact on the user. Lastly, this chapter defines the scope and research questions of this
research work.
Chapter two is about the background information of browser hijacking. This
chapter discusses the related work and preference architecture of Google Chrome and
Mozilla Firefox. Further, this chapter addresses the preferences targeted in browser
hijacking. This chapter presents the existing solutions of the browsers Google Chrome and
Mozilla Firefox against an unwanted modification. Later, this chapter continues with a
study of the add-on system and add-on architecture. This chapter completes the discussion
of the methods of accessing preferences in both the browsers.
Chapter three is all about the approach and the design of our proposed solution. It
discusses all of the design steps of the add-on and presents the features provided by the
add-on. Chapter four presents the user interaction and performance measure of the
implemented add-on with corresponding screenshots. The final chapter discusses the
limitations of the add-on and presents the future recommendations, followed by the
summary of the thesis.

7

2.

Background & Literature Review

Background Information on Web Browser Attacks
A browser is one of the primary and necessary applications on any computer that
has a network connection. The browser is the platform for a user to access many different
activities, including social networking, online shopping, financial services, and educational
resources. (Ter Louw et al., 2009).
Paul Lonescu (2015) gives a brief report on different kinds of attacks in a web
browser. URL redirecting is one of those attacks. In a URL redirect attack, attackers try to
forward URLs of frequently visited websites to a web location that hots malware, which
is undesired by the end user. Attackers exploit the additional software running in the
browser like plug-ins and add-ons. Poor maintenance and lack of proper updating of old
software are among the targets to attackers that exploit. Through attacking old software in
the system, it is possible to steal sensitive information of the user that the browser sends
and receive, which are unsecured with old security mechanisms (Zuccato et al., 2015).
Attackers try to inject malware JavaScript into trusted websites using Cross-site scripting
(XSS), which might inject advertisements or do some malicious activity in the browser.
Another important type of web attacks is browser hijacking, which is the modification of
preferences without user notice, and this thesis is about preventing browser hijacking.

8

Removal of some malicious codes is easy by uninstalling the corresponding
malware using the computer’s control panel application. The user has a chance to avoid
these types of software, but in some cases, the process of removing malware is tougher. A
more difficult removal method involves installing a malware removal tool to remove
unwanted programs in the system. Other solutions include deleting hidden add-ons in the
browser, removing browser registry files, and removing all of the browser’s locally stored
data. These methods might be painful for the user to go through the total process of
removal.
The solution in this thesis is simple compared to these types of solutions. The addon will confirm with the user before saving new changes and provides information
regarding the source of any change. With the add-on, it is very easy for the user to protect
browser preferences.

2.1.1. Spyware
Spyware is one category of web malware programs in which the attackers interrupt,
taking limited or full control of a system operation without the knowledge of the authorized
system user (Gribble et al, 2016). Several types of attacks in the web browser fall under
spyware. AM Payton (2006) gave a report discussing different spyware tools and
techniques. The various kinds of attacks discussed by him are:


Random advertisements which show up automatically,



Automatic download of malware known as drive-by download,



Session hijacking,
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Bundled packages download,



Fake anti-spyware pop-ups appear with the description "Your browser is
infected and you need to install anti-virus tools," and



Browser hijacking.

Regarding preferences, Payton discussed that the browser hijackers change the
browser preferences like homepage URL to advertising pages, drive-by download pages,
and other sites for commercial purposes. Hijackers change browser security preferences
allowing silent installation of third party software, which leads to modification of the
normal browser operation.
Steven Gribble (2016) proposed a detection technique for spyware, which is one of
the latest research efforts on detecting spyware. They used a virtual machine (VM) to detect
and stop spyware entering the computer. They implemented a tool to detect the activities
of spyware and drive-by downloads in the browser. They used a VM to stop and analyze
malware programs in their tool. When downloading and installing any program executable
files in a virtual machine environment, there are many tools available to detect if the
executable file is malicious or not. In this way when the user is opening a web page in a
VM environment controlled browser, their tool alerts the user if there are any attacks of
malicious program downloading or drive-by downloads.

Related Work
A vast amount of research work is available for detection and classification of an
URL to categorize it as malicious or non-malicious. Niels Provos and his team (2010) from
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Google did one such type of research analyzing malware attacking browsers. They mainly
concentrated on detection of malware web applications and creating a database. They
analyzed several millions of URLs and successfully found 450k URLs, which download
malware into the browser and several thousands of malicious URLs. MoshChuk and
colleagues (2005) did a similar type of research. He studied about web applications which
are downloading malware binaries into the browser. Both of them concentrated on
detecting malware websites rather than defending.
This thesis is entirely different from this research. This thesis focused on only
preferences exploitation which is one part of web malware, and the proposed solution is a
user interactive solution rather than an analysis and the detection of malware.
There is a lot of research done and published on security and exploitations in
browser add-ons, and a few of them are discussed here. Mike Ter Louw and his team (2009)
proposed a security solution in the browser regarding add-ons. For analyzing how could an
add-on damage the browser, they developed a malicious add-on that attacks the browser.
They observed two major problems; code integrity and attacking the user-sensitive
information in the browser. They proposed user authentication to the add-ons and granting
permission only for authorized add-ons. They tested their solution using many Firefox addons and were successful in achieving desired solutions.
Felt (2010) studied the permissions given to Firefox add-ons and states 88% of the
add-ons do not require the permissions that they have. He proposed a new add-on system
that gives very limited privileges to add-ons to more concisely meet their needs.
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Karsten Knuth (2012) analyzed the add-on system of the following browsers:
Internet Explorer, Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, and Safari. He listed all of the
vulnerabilities in each browser add-on architecture. He developed a Chrome add-on for
testing and proposed new security mechanisms in the Chrome add-on system.
Rezwana Karim (2015) studied the present Mozilla Firefox add-on system's
security and proposed enhanced security to the architecture. They presented Beacon, which
detects unsafe practices in JavaScript programs and detected 36 unsafe cases in 68000 lines
of JavaScript code. Mozilla Firefox implemented a new add-on system and required porting
of legacy add-ons to the latest add-on system. For this, Karim provided a technique called
Morpheus for porting purpose while showing vulnerabilities in legacy add-ons.
Nicolas Golubovic (2016) studied attacks through add-ons in the browser. He
manually tested add-ons, which is different to previous research in this area and provided
case studies on attacks through vulnerable add-ons. He implemented a test suite for add-on
system testing and states that current security mechanisms are not sufficient to prevent
attacks in a browser.
There are few studies on broad browser hijacking, which means the research is not
just about browser preferences but includes other malicious activities in the browser also.
Diogo Monica and Carlos Ribeiro’s (2015) studies were one of the latest research efforts.
They developed a tool in the form of an add-on to detect browser hijacking activity in the
browser. Their tool detects any suspicious activity in the browser and automatically reports
the malicious URLs. Their primary intention is to detect hijacking activity and report it to
the user. They used a certain number of factors for detecting hijacking such as JavaScript
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code running in a potentially harmful manner, botnet commands in the browser, and linear
detector used to separate browser hijacking based on some factors. Their tool is successful
in detecting malicious activity. However, this tool needs validation with larger datasets.
Diogo Monica et al., (2015) developed a tool that has some specific features such
as not needing a network connection and remote data. All the factors for detection are
available in the browser add-on only, and the add-on operates without the need for any
additional components. The add-on developed in this thesis also does not require any
additional resources.
There is minimal research conducted on the hijacking of browser preferences. One
of them is "Software protection against changeware" by Sebastian Banescu and colleagues
(2015), but it is for general software assets, and in the case of a browser, the assets are
preferences. They proposed a solution to protect software data from changeware.
Changeware is a piece of code or software that attacks and changes software application
assets. These assets are the important files of the software such as preferences in a browser.
Changeware is different from other types of malicious programs. It does not need
deep permission in an operating system as the developers of the changeware target only
the changeable resources of software. These changeable resources are not under operating
system security mechanisms, and this makes it easy for the changeware developers to
attack the assets of software. Banescu and colleagues (2015) explain that various antimalware software available are unable to stop changeware attacks as these attacks look like
an authentic operation in the operating system.

13

The solution proposed by Banescu and colleagues (2015) is to provide security in
the target application which has important assets. For instance, if the Google Chrome
browser is the target application, and their proposed solution suggests modifications to the
Chrome architecture. They had implemented the solution in the Chromium browser to
protect preferences from hijacking and evaluated implementation as a case study. They had
implemented the solution only in the Windows operating system, but the proposed solution
in this thesis is independent of the operating system. Their protection mechanisms include
software diversity and white box cryptography. They detect asynchronous calls made in
the software application and verify them. They verified these calls against a set of genuine
calls, which is a list of possible calls in that particular software. Their solution also consists
of run-time checking, and it includes injection of code in calls. This code injection is only
possible in the Windows operating system as the Linux-based operating systems does not
allow this.
Another research effort discussed here is about exploitation of browser preferences.
Thomas Wespel and Thomas Salomon (2015) filed a patent on technology to stop changes
to preferences like homepage, search engine, and new tab URL from freeware software
installations. They discussed different methods of preferences exploitation and proposed a
cloud-based solution.
They discussed that changes in preferences are primarily due to advertising and
marketing in the browser. Some major companies like Java also provide these types of
recommendations for changes in browser preferences. When installing Java, there is an
opt-out option for not changing the browser preferences. If users miss that opt-out option
or overlook the recommendation, the additional software will modify the preferences.
14

In the case of hijacked preferences, browsers do not allow users to easily revert the
hijacked values to previous preference values (Wespel & Salomon, 2015). The user needs
to revert all the preferences to default preferences values or revert every single preference
to their choice of value, which is somewhat time-consuming. Wespel & Salomon (2015)
describes that reverting the preferences to previous values is possible through their
proposed solution, which relieves users from this time-consuming problem. In the solution
described in this thesis, whenever there is a change and if the add-on detects that the user
did not do the change, then the add-on reverts the changes preferences to old values. If the
user wants to save the new changes, then the add-on saves the new values. Otherwise, the
add-on will discard the new changes and save the old values.
Wespel and Salomon (2015) proposed a database of blacklisted preferences based
on some analysis. The analysis includes the events of malware, new software installation,
and drive-by downloads. After detecting a preference change in a suspicious manner, their
solution will verify whether the preference is a blacklisted preference. If it is a blacklisted
preference, then they will report to the user about the change and provide recommendations
accordingly.
While in this thesis case, preferences changed without user notice are immediately
reported to the user and asked whether to save or discard new changes. In the solution
described in this thesis, the add-on need not maintain any database nor does statistical
analysis unlike what Thomas & Salomon(2015) claimed to do.

15

Preference System
Preferences, options, and settings are synonyms in browser terminology. The user
can configure the browser through preferences. Users can change the browser’s behavior
by modifying the preferences to their desired values. For instance, users can set the value
of preference homepage to a frequently visited web page, so that they can easily access that
web page by simply clicking the home button. In this way, by configuring the browser with
desired preference values, users can save a little time.
In the Google Chrome architecture, each preference has a value and key, and the
key is the means of accessing preferences in add-ons. The preference values are of different
data types, which are Boolean, string, integer, or other specific type based on a particular
preference. There are different kinds of preferences in Google Chrome; some are runtime
editable preferences, preferences modified at start time and shutdown time, and preferences
stored by add-ons (Battre & Pamg, 2013). Users configure only the runtime editable
preferences, which are the focus of this thesis.
Battre and Pamg (2013) describe that the preferences are stored locally in a file
called "preferences.json" and the user’s profile folder contains this file. The user’s profile
folder is available in the corresponding browser locally stored data. Chrome maintains
separate profiles if more than one user is using the browser. At the time of browser
installation, there will be no profile folder. Opening the browser for the first time will
retrieve the preferences from the master preferences file, which contains default
preferences values. While using the browser for the first time, the browser will create a
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profile folder. From the second time of opening the browser application, the browser loads
the preferences from the preferences file, which is available in the user’s profile folder.
In Mozilla Firefox, the preference system is somewhat different. Preferences in
Mozilla Firefox are available through XPCOM services, and "nsIPrefService" and
"nsIPrefBranch" are the interfaces when accessing the preferences. Mozilla designed the
preferences in a tree branches method, and every category of preferences lies under the
root branch of the tree. For example, the accessibility group of preferences is available
under the Accessibility child branch of the preferences root branch. For accessing
preferences, the add-on developer uses nsIPrefService and the name used in accessing
includes its ancestors also. For instance, to access the preference, "enablesound," the word
"accessibility.typeaheadfind.enablesound" is used. The preference "enablesound" is a child
branch of typeaheadfind, which is a child node of accessibility. The preferences names
available in the page “about:config” are according to this tree branch.
In Google Chrome, users can see the configurable preferences on the web page with
the URL, "chrome://preferences," and in Mozilla Firefox, "about: preferences" is the URL.
Users can open these web pages by clicking the “Options/Settings” button available on the
toolbar of the corresponding browser. In this document options/settings page refers to these
web pages. Some of the runtime editable preferences and the user configurable preferences
are only visible on the preferences page. In Mozilla Firefox, users can see all the
preferences by using the URL, "about:config," and only some of them are available on the
options page with the URL, "about:preferences".

17

2.3.1. Preferences targeted in Browser Hijacking
This research analyzed the key targeted preferences in browser hijacking in
designing a robust solution. The default search engine is one of the preferences which is
one of the hijacker’s prime targets. Examples of the major search engines are Google,
Yahoo, Bing, Baidu, Ask.com, AOL, and Yandex. Browser hijackers exploit this
preference in several ways, and users might face a tough time in getting the preference
back to their desired value. On a modified search engine, the users get unexpected results
in the browser and need to search again for the desired search engine results.
Another significant browser preference that the hijacker targets is the exploitation
of browser homepage. Users set their homepage to their desired URL which they frequently
visit and save their time by just clicking the home button on the toolbar of the browser.
Unexpected changes in the homepage URL due to the modifications of browser preferences
may annoy the user.
Some hijackers target preferences such as “Block pop-up windows” and “Block
Dangerous & deceptive content”. They modify these two preferences values to false, which
are true by default. By altering Block pop-up windows to false, any web page can open
random and unwanted advertisement pop-ups without the interaction of the user. These
pop-ups trick the user to click them, which cause the download of malicious content or
forward to an irrelevant website. By enabling this preference to true, the browser will block
pop-ups, which cause malicious attacks. By disabling “Block dangerous and deceptive
content,” the user will be at risk from dangerous and malware websites. The user might
unknowingly expose valuable information to suspicious third party websites.
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Another significant preference targeted is new tab URL, the hijackers modify this
preference value to an organization website for publicity and commerciality purposes.
Users cannot change this preference directly in options page "about:preferences," and if
they want to customize a new tab page, then they need to install any add-on like "New tab
override" which customizes new tab URL. Users should go through this long process for
reverting this preference value to their desired page URL.
In the design of solution, this thesis considered the above preferences more
important than other runtime editable preferences. This thesis researched all the possible
ways a hijacker might try to exploit these preferences and designed the add-on accordingly.

Comparing Browser Actions against Unwanted Changes
As previously mentioned, this thesis studied security measures on preferences taken
by two browsers, Google Chrome and Mozilla Firefox. Considering Google Chrome, silent
installation of an add-on, which is installing an add-on into the browser without user
permission, is not possible. The user must agree to installing an add-on into the browser.
Another useful measure Chrome gives its users is that if an add-on modifies any
preferences, then it will display the name of the add-on above that preference in the settings
page. In this way, the user knows which third party tool is controlling a particular
preference.
When an add-on modifies a preference value, Chrome does not warn the user about
modification of a corresponding preference immediately. However, it will give information
about modifications when the user performs an activity in the browser related to that
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particular preference. For instance, an add-on or malicious code modified the preference
default search engine in the browser. At the time of modification, Chrome does not warn
the user about search engine modification. When the user searches for something in the
Omnibox, the browser gives results from the new search engine. Now Chrome gives a
warning pop-up showing "Is this the change in the search engine you are expecting?" or
"Are these the results you are expecting" and gives the user an option whether they want
to revert the search engine to a previous value. The solution in this thesis is such that the
add-on will generate a pop-up immediately at the moment of a change in preference without
users notice.
Coming to Firefox browser, silent installation of add-ons is possible. There is a
preference called "warn before installing of add-on silently." Disabling this preference, the
hijacker can easily install add-ons without user permission. Unlike Chrome, Firefox does
not warn about modifications in preferences at any time. If any add-on modifies
preferences, then the user should manually revert those preferences or uninstall the
particular add-on that modified the preferences. The user does not have any option to know
which add-on changed the particular preference value. The Google Chrome browser has
the upper hand compared to Mozilla Firefox in preferences protection with providing users
some warning pop-ups.

Add-on System
Add-ons became very powerful, and popular nowadays and will be in the future.
(Felt, 2010). Add-on is a synonym for extension in the browser field. An add-on is a piece
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of software which extends the functionality of the browser. Plug-in is different from addon, in that a plug-in also extends a browser’s functional operations, but the functionality of
the plug-in is specific to a page. An add-on is browser specific and functionality is all over
the browser and not specific to one web page. For instance, Adobe Reader or any media
player is a plug-in, which is web page specific. "Search and Newtab by Yahoo" is an addon, which changes preferences default search engine and new tab URL to Yahoo.
Add-on developers keep all of the files needed for the add-on in one file, and the
add-on development tool will export that single file into a browser-supported format. The
browser-supported format is the format of an add-on file in a particular browser. It is a
"crx" type of file in the case of Google Chrome and "xpi" type of file in the case of Mozilla
Firefox. Users can simply download these types of files and install them into the browser.
The process of installing an add-on will be less than one minute, and the user does
not need to follow any steps for installing. The user can find different add-ons available in
the official add-on store of the browser. After finding a suitable add-on, with a single click
users can simply install the add-on in the browser. The simple installation process is one
of the reasons to choose an add-on for implementing the proposed solution.
Another reason to select an add-on as our implementation is, in any research
implemented, the solution needs feedback and suggestions from users. To get feedback,
many users should use the developed solution. In the browser, an add-on is the quick path
to reach users. The Firefox official add-on store AMO (addons.mozilla.org) statistics show
that the total count of add-ons used daily is 200 million to 300 million in only the Firefox
Browser. These statistics adds support to implement the proposed solution in the form of
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an add-on. With the add-on, it is possible to get feedback from users and suggestions easily.
With the feedback from users, the developers can modify the add-on, and release a new
version.
The performance degraded by installing an add-on is also minimal, and
performance of the add-on is also good. The fourth chapter discusses the performance of
the add-on in detail. The add-on will not cause any disturbance to the user’s browsing
experience unless there is an unwanted modification.

Add-on Architecture
An add-on is an exported version of a group of files. These files are of different
formats such as JSON, JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Add-on developers have access to
several APIs provided by the browser. Add-ons can perform different types of actions
related to the browser, including content scripts changing, adding buttons to toolbars, and
web content blocking. Developers can add a user interface if required to the add-on and
provide customization to the browser. The following sections discuss the add-on
architecture of the browsers Google Chrome and Mozilla Firefox.

2.6.1. Google Chrome
In any add-on, there must be one file which provides essential information and the
starting point of execution. "Manifest.json" is the most important file in a Google Chrome
add-on. It contains the all of the necessary information regarding the add-on. Any typical
Google Chrome add-on consists of following files:
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1.

Manifest.json file

2.

HTML files (zero or more as per need)

3.

JavaScript files (one or more as per need)

4.

Data folder

The “manifest.json” file is an essential file for every Google Chrome add-on. It
contains the basic information regarding the add-on such as developer name, version
number, add-on name, and minimum chrome version required for installing. It contains the
name of the JavaScript file that is the starting point of execution at the time of add-on
installation and every further browser start-up. If the add-on requires its own
preferences/options, then the developer should mention them in this file. This file contains
all of the details about the self-preferences including name, description, title, the data type
of the value, and the default value. The "manifest.json" file initiates the execution of all of
the other files, whether HTML or JavaScript. Following is an example of, how the
"manifest.json" file looks (Brandon H. Baker. 2013)
{
"manifest_version": 2,
"name": "Preferences protection",
"description": "This add-on protects
preferences from unwanted changes",
"version": "1.0",
"browser_action": {
"default_icon": "icon.png",
"default_popup": "popup.html"
},
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the

browser

"permissions": [
"activeTab"
]
}

The above code is a very basic manifest file. In the above code, popup.html file is
the HTML file used for displaying the content of a pop-up window upon clicking the addon icon on the toolbar. Similarly, developers can use several other HTML and JavaScript
files for add-on development. A manifest file does not contain any logic code; instead it
contains all of the information about the add-on. It is like metadata about the add-on. This
file contains a description of extra features and restrictions in the add-on.
The data folder contains all the required images for the add-on such as icons and
pictures needed as part of the user-interface. The developer has the flexibility to include
many files and different file formats.
Add-on developers can use standard Google Chrome add-on APIs for interacting
with browser actions. There are many APIs available, and each serves a specific operation.
For instance, they can use the button API for adding an action listener to any buttons. They
can write on-change listeners for preferences values using the preferences API. They can
use the tabs API to read the active tab URL of the browser.
In Google Chrome, developers must mention the permissions needed for the addon. Google Chrome designed their latest add-on policy in such a way that an add-on can
only request the services it needs. By this restriction, it eliminates security issues from
buggy add-ons.
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2.6.2. Mozilla Firefox
In Firefox, three different types of add-on implementation methods are available:
bootstrap add-ons, web add-ons, and SDK add-ons. Web add-ons are the newest add-on
system out of the three, and the bootstrap add-ons system is the oldest one. The problem
with bootstrap add-ons is that developers need to learn XUL programming, which takes a
lot of time. Another issue is that the bootstrap add-ons are restart add-ons, which means to
complete the installation of the add-on, the user must close and reopen the browser. The
web add-ons system is in the development stage, and there are no APIs available to develop
the solution proposed in this thesis. (Wbamberg, 2016).
Based on the above information, this thesis selected the SDK add-ons system for
developing, so that users can complete the installation process of the add-on without
restarting the browser. Developing an SDK add-on is easy compared to other add-on
systems. Documentation for SDK add-ons is also good and sufficient for low-level
technical user’s understanding. It is possible to develop the proposed solution using the
resources available for SDK add-ons.
Following is the basic architecture of an SDK add-on. Similar to the "manifest.json"
file in Google Chrome, "package.json" is the most important file in a Mozilla Firefox addon. It contains all of the essential information about the add-on. A typical Mozilla Firefox
SDK add-on contains the following files:
1. “package.json”
2. “main.js”
3. Other HTML and JavaScript files as required
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4. Data Folder
5. Test folder

"Package.json" is an essential file and the add-on implementation starts with
writing this file. It contains all of the basic information about the add-on such as the title
of the add-on, description of the add-on, developer of the add-on, version number,
minimum Firefox version number required to install the add-on, main JavaScript file name,
and keywords. The file, "main.js," is the starting execution point of the add-on. The file
"package.json" does not contain any information regarding other JavaScript or HTML files
used for pop-up windows. It is like metadata of the add-on. Following is an example of
how the "package.json" file looks:

{
"title": "Settings Protection",
"name": "Settings-protection",
"version": "1.0.1",
"description": "To prevent the unwanted preferences
changes in the browser",
"main": "main.js",
"author": "ACSL WSU",
"engines": {
"firefox": ">=38.0a1",
"fennec": ">=38.0a1"
},
"license": "ACSL",
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"keywords": [
"preferences"
]
}

The "main.js" file is the next important file of the add-on. It contains all of the code
for the add-on execution. It can access other files in the add-on folder including data and
test folders. The above code will be the same for any Firefox add-on. The main field in the
"package.json" file describes the name of the file, where execution starts. Developers need
to write all of the other code in "main.js" and supporting JavaScript or HTML files.
The data folder contains the images required for add-on icons and other data files.
The test folder is optional, and developers can use this file to store documentation and
testing files for things like exporting the add-on. Developers will write code in "main.js"
and for simplicity of coding, can add other HTML or JavaScript files. The data folder
contains these additional files for quick accessing.
If the add-on functionality requires its own preferences/options, the developers
should mention them in the "package.json" file only. Developers can also hide these
preferences in add-on options. The title and description for each preference will be visible
to the user. A checkbox will be visible for toggling the preference value if the datatype of
the preference is a Boolean datatype. If it is a number or string, then a text area will appear
accordingly. Following is an example of a self-preference declaration in the "package.json"
file:
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{
"description": "Never change preferences/options from
outside of preferences page. When you enable this
feature, then the add-on discards any change in
preference/option value which is not from preferences
page",
"name": "NeverChange",
"type": "bool",
"value": false,
"title": "Never change preferences/options from
outside of preferences page"
},

Mozilla Firefox has standard APIs, which are helpful to add-on developers. For
instance, developers can use the preference system API for modifying and getting
preference values, and writing on-change event listeners for preferences. They can use the
SDK/tab API for reading the active tab URL of the browser. Panel and button APIs are
available for the user-interface part of the add-on.
An add-on interacts with the user through pop-up windows, and the panel API in
Mozilla Firefox provides these windows. Developers need to include HTML files for
displaying content in a panel. Developers can add JavaScript files for Document Object
Model (DOM) manipulation and data passing. DOM manipulation is updating the data of
the panel window, and it is possible to pass data dynamically to the HTML elements from
the JavaScript file. Developers should mention the information about these panels such as
the supporting file name, dimension properties, and focus properties of a panel in the main
file, that is "main.js." The following is example for an SDK panel declaration:
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var textEntryPanel = require("sdk/panel").Panel({
width:530,
height:390,
contentURL: data.url("text-entry.html"),
contentScriptFile:data.url("get-text.js")
});

In the above code, contentURL is the URL of an HTML file, and
contentScriptFile is the URL of a supporting script file in the current directory. It is possible
to set a panel focus property, such that the pop-up will not fade away if users click outside
of the panel dimensions. However, the user can close the browser when there is an active
pop-up, and this is a limitation of these panels. As part of the content in the HTML file, the
developer can add any framework for extra functionality as per the design requirements.

Accessing Preferences
In Google Chrome, add-on developers can access the preferences easily using
stable APIs provided by Chrome for add-on developers. An add-on has permissions to get
the current value of preference or set a new value to preference. Add-ons are able to detect
the changes in preferences by using an event observer for that particular preference. Upon
notification, add-ons can do anything with the particular preference. If two add-ons
simultaneously want to set a particular preference, then the value set by the add-on installed
latest dominates (Battre and Pamg, 2013).
Google Chrome allows the add-on to configure only the preferences it requested
and it will not allow the add-on to change or get the other preferences. If the add-on should
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be effective in the incognito window also, then developers should specify this in the
"manifest.json" file. Preferences set by an add-on dominates those set by the user and
default values of the preferences. In Google Chrome, all preferences are either Boolean,
string, or integer, and never an object nor array.
Considering Mozilla Firefox, developers can access the preferences using the
preference service API in an SDK add-on. However, it is not possible to access some
preferences using this API. Some preferences like new tab page and search engine are not
accessible with this API. Florian Queze (2015) reported the add-on developers misuse new
Tab URL preference, and Mozilla considered this complaint and removed that preference
from the options page. By removing that New tab preference, it is no longer available in
"about:config" page for modification or reading. Add-on developers should use the
"newtabURL.jsm" service for accessing preference new tab URL.
Developers cannot access another significant preference, that is search engine using
the reference service API. Firefox stores this preference values as a plug-in object with a
set of properties. For accessing the search engine, developers should use the service
"nsIBrowserSearchService." With this service, an add-on can retrieve the current search
engine or replace it with a new engine. Before changing the search engine to a new value,
developers should add the new engine to the group of search engine plugins available in
the browser. Developers need to provide properties like name, URL, icon URL, and data
type to the new search engine object.
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3.

Add-on Design and Implementation

Approach
The main aim of this thesis is to stop random changes in browser preferences in
which the user is not aware of. The initial idea of this thesis is to stop changes in preferences
completely, that is to stop any modifications the user does not know about and then ask the
user whether to save or discard the changes to the preferences. The user should go through
authentication for saving new changes in preferences. During and before the authentication,
the old values of preferences are only in action and configured in the browser. However, a
few problems in preventing unwanted modifications completely.
The first issue is the browser preference architecture. In some applications, users
need to click the "okay" button after configuring preferences and only after this are the new
changes placed into action. In the case of browser preferences, they are of a different type
compared to the above applications. In the browser, the preferences available to the user
for modification are runtime editable preferences, and the user does not need to click any
button after making modifications. The moment there is a change in preference, the
browser configures and operates accordingly with the new changes. For example, if any
add-on sets a different URL as the value of preference homepage, then from that moment,
clicking the home button will load the new homepage URL.
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In this architecture, it is not possible to stop the changes from happening. Stopping
random changes completely requires modifying the architecture of the browser should,
which means changing the source code of the browser. For a complete prevention
implementation, modifying the source code of the browser is the only solution. While
studying about modifying the browser source code, there are few problems. Browser source
code is large and takes a huge amount of time to understand. Another issue is that building
the source code requires computers with decent performance, which is expensive. Based
on these factors, this thesis avoided implementation in this way and searched for
alternatives.
This thesis considered the approach of observing and restricting modifications to
the file "preference.json." The browser saves the preferences in a file called
"preference.json" available in the user’s profile folder. Whenever there is a change in this
file, the user should confirm the changes. Keeping a barrier to this file modification is
difficult as this file contains all other preferences along with the runtime editable
preferences. The other type of preferences included in this file are preferences modified
without the user interaction and the preferences modified at the time of browser start-up
and shut down. It is not possible to know the type of changed preference upon this file
modification and implementation in this way is also not possible.
This thesis researched what an add-on can do regarding preferences exploitation.
This research studied the add-on architecture to know what permissions an add-on has on
preferences. An add-on can retrieve and set the value of preferences to a different value,
and it can also observe changes in preferences. The add-on installing process is very
straightforward and user-friendly. An add-on does not require any building costs and users
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can simply download the add-on and install it in their browser from the official browser
add-on store. With these positive factors, this thesis decided to implement the solution in
the form of an add-on.

Overview of the Proposed Solution
This thesis provided the proposed solution in the form of an add-on. The following
points give a brief outline of the solution:
•

Upon installation of the add-on, the user needs to select an authentication:
master password or separate (used for the add-on only) password.

•

If the user selects separate authentication, to handle the case of a forgotten
password the user needs to enter security questions and answers.

•

The add-on stores the old values of the preferences and listens for preferences
modifications.

•

The add-on authenticates every change in preferences not made by the user and
modifications in the add-on self-preferences.

•

Upon a change in preference, determine whether the user initiated the change
or not.

•

If the change is not from the user, then a pop-up window will appear with the
user selected type of authentication and the user should choose whether to save
or discard changes.
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•

The add-on provides users with some specific features in the form of selfpreferences, which include blocking preferences page, never changing
preference values, and exempting certain preferences from monitoring.

Add-on Implementation
Upon deciding to develop an add-on to implement the proposed solution, choosing
the browser (Google Chrome or Mozilla Firefox) is the next task. For selecting the browser,
this thesis studied the add-on architecture of the two browsers and came to know that there
are some differences in the permissions available to an add-on over preferences. The
proposed solution is possible in both of the browsers and initially planned to implement
the proposed solution in both browsers. Realizing that developing the same solution in both
browsers is meaningless and decided to develop only for one browser. It helps to
concentrate more on adding additional features and handling multiple cases if developed
for a single browser rather than developing for both of the browsers.
At this point, the browser selection for implementing the proposed solution is still
undecided. For selecting the browser, this thesis considered the factors such as which
browser has given more importance to the preferences exploitation issue in their security
mechanisms and the browser action against unwanted changes currently. Google Chrome
gives warning pop-ups when there is change happened without the user notice. Further,
Chrome gives information about the software controlling the modified preference. In the
case of Mozilla Firefox, there is no such type of warning pop-ups about unwanted
modifications.
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Based on this information, this thesis selected the browser with lower security
mechanisms, so that it would reach a large number of users and help in getting feedback.
This thesis selected the browser Mozilla Firefox as it is lacking compared to Google
Chrome concerning the above factors.
Development started with studying the basics of add-on development for Firefox.
Firefox has a unique add-on architecture which helped in designing the add-on, and many
useful APIs are available for add-on developers. After studying the APIs available, an addon cannot stop changes in preferences. An add-on can only detect the change of any
preference, and any further action is not possible to take until a change happens. The first
goal in implementing the add-on is handling preference values.

3.3.1. Handling Preferences Values
The add-on needs to have control over preferences values such as reading the
present value and modifying the value to a different one. The add-on requires these
operations to revert preferences values to the old values upon unwanted changes and set
the new values of preferences if the user confirms the new changes. With the
preference/service API the add-on can easily access and modify the present values of
preferences. Each preference has a name used with the preference API for accessing.
A list of preferences with their values is available on the page with the URL
"about:config". On this page, all of the preferences are available with their current values,
and it is possible to modify any preference values on the same page. For instance, the name
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of the preference homepage URL used for accessing is "browser.startup.homepage". The
statement used to get the value is
require("sdk/preferences/service").get("browser.startu
p.homepage")
and to set the value of the homepage URL to the Google search engine website is
"require("sdk/preferences/service").set("browser.start
up.homepage","http://www.google.com")".
Only some of the preferences listed on the page with the URL "about:config" are
available in the options page with the URL, "about:preferences". The preferences available
on the options page are more understandable as they are visually displayed, and this makes
it easy for the user to set the desired values. While considering the page with the URL
"about:config" it would be difficult for users to modify the preferences values. Users should
have technical knowledge of preferences and preference names to modify on the page
"about:config". Even some technical people rarely modify the remaining preferences on
the page "about:config" so the add-on will not monitor these preferences.
The add-on does not monitor all of the preferences on the "about:config" page
because browser hijackers generally target only the preferences on the options page. The
add-on will store all of the current values of monitoring preferences because upon
unwanted changes the add-on uses the current values for reverting modified preferences to
their previous values.
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There is a problem in saving the current values as normal variables. The browser
deletes the memory of these variables at the time of shutdown as these are part of temporary
storage. The add-on should store these values in permanent memory as it needs these values
at the time of browser restarting. In Mozilla Firefox, add-ons can save memory persistently
by using the “simple storage API”. The add-on used this API to save the current values of
preferences so that they do not vanish after a browser shutdown.
The next step is to write action listeners for each preference to trigger after a change.
Add-on developers can use the Preference/event-target API write on-change event listeners
for preference values. Developers uses the preferences names from the page "about:config"
for writing listeners.
The preference/event-target API cannot monitor the preference search engine For
the current search engine, the add-on used a normal event observer to observe changes in
this preference. After a modification trigger, the add-on needs to know whether there is a
need to authenticate or simply save the new change. The following sections discusses
briefly the authentication method used in this thesis.

3.3.2. Authentication Methods
Throughout this document, this thesis mentions that the add-on will save the
unwanted modifications only with the user confirmation. User confirmation means the user
should give some input to the add-on that they agree to the new changes. One such type of
input is to click the button “okay” in the pop-ups that appear. If the user needs to click only
the "okay" button for confirmation, then they may simply click the "okay" button without
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reading the description in the pop-up window. Users may also click the "okay" button
unintentionally while doing some work. Some users might also click the "okay" button in
the thought of general security measure. Considering the above factors, this thesis added
authentication in the add-on for the user confirmation.
The user needs to enter a password for saving changes or click cancel for discarding
new changes. In the authentication process, the user cannot click cancel in the thought of a
general pop-up. There will be no mistaking the of pop-up as a general security windows
since the user needs to enter a password. In this process, the user will read the pop-up
window description to know what is the purpose of the authentication. The following
paragraph discusses the authentication method used in this add-on.
For authentication, this thesis considered a few different methods. One way is to
authenticate by using the operating system password. In this authentication method, the
operating system password pop-up window appears for the user’s confirmation. There are
some problems with this authentication method such as that the process of integrating the
operating system password is difficult, and the add-on must deal with a lot of security
barriers which could affect add-on performance severely. This method is also operating
system specific, and the developers must develop the add-on for each operating system and
each browser separately, which requires a lot of time. With these problems, this thesis did
not consider this authentication method.
This thesis searched for an authentication method with factors such as built into the
browser, the add-on has accessibility to the authentication method, and the method is not
unique to an operating system. The master password in Mozilla Firefox is one of the
38

authentication methods satisfying the above conditions. The master password is built into
Firefox and provides authentication for viewing saved logins. If the user uses the master
password in the browser, then for viewing saved logins they should enter the password.
Master Password is very secure, ease to access and not operating system specific. These
are advantages of using the master password authentication. However, if the user does not
want to use the master password for any reasons then the add-on cannot use this
authentication method.
This thesis also considered an alternative method, that is separate authentication
used in this add-on only. For ease of use and implementation, this thesis designed a simple
authentication method and called it separate authentication. However, there are a few
security issues with implementing the add-on's own authentication. The problem with this
approach is storage of the password on the local system. This thesis considered Firefox
password manager for storing the password in this method, which is very secure and
protected. The problem of storing a password in the password manager is, the password is
visible to the browser user in saved logins. If the user is not using the master password,
then there is no barrier to viewing saved logins and the password of this add-on is also
viewable in the password manager. For better security, this method requires hashing of the
password.
Hashing is converting a string of characters into a fixed length of characters. For
password hashing, this thesis considered different hashing techniques.

This thesis

considered only hashing techniques rather than encryption and decryption because
encryption techniques require a private key. It is not possible to store the key securely in
the add-on so this thesis considered keyless hashing techniques only. This thesis considered
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few popular hashing techniques: MD5 (Message Digest), SHA-1 (Secure Hash Algorithm),
and SHA-2. Any of these hashing techniques would serve the purpose. Gupta (2014)
describes that SHA algorithms should be given importance than MD5 in terms of security
and performance. Among different SHA algorithms with various digests, this thesis uses
SHA-2 with a digest of 256 because a higher digest like 512 would take more time to
calculate the hash and lower digest are less secure and high chances of collisions occurring.
It is possible to decode the hash obtained with the SHA – 2 hashing technique using
tools available in online. To overcome this problem, this thesis added salt to the password
string before hashing. Salt hashing is adding random text to the password before hashing
to make decoding of the hash more difficult. By adding salt to input, it will be difficult to
decode the hash generated with available online tools. In the implementation, the add-on
adds the salt text to the password text before hashing the password. Online tools available
to decode the hash are unable to decode the hash obtained after adding salt. This thesis’s
main intention is not authentication, so this thesis did not concentrate on hashing and
authentication in depth. This thesis focused on preferences modifications and different
ways of exploiting preferences rather than authentication mechanisms.
Master password authentication and separate authentication of this add-on meet this
thesis’s design requirements. Each authentication method has some advantages and
disadvantages. Without compromising, this thesis implemented both of the authentication
methods. Users can select the method of authentication per their need and ease of use.
The flow chart in Figure 2 explains the installation steps performed in the add-on.
Based on whether the user is using Master password or not, the first pop-up will appear. It
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Figure 2. Add-on Installation Flowchart
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is their choice to select the type of authentication. For separate authentication, users need
to enter the password and select & answer security questions. For the master password,
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"about:preferences#security" which will open automatically upon their selection. The addon will save the current values of the preferences, and there is no need of user interaction
for this step. With this step, the add-on installation process is complete, and the add-on
listens for new changes.

3.3.3. Detecting a Non-user Change
To completely prevent changes, the add-on needs to authenticate users, even if they
changed preferences on their own. If the add-on authenticates every change, the user needs
to enter their password every time they try to change preferences, and it is not user-friendly.
The goal of this thesis is to stop changes that will occur without the user’s notice and the
solution provided should not interrupt changes made by the user.
After detecting a preference modification, the add-on needs to classify it as a user
change or a change that occurred without the user’s notice. A user change means the user
changed the preference value and a non-user change means the user did not change the
preference value. For this classification, this thesis gathered information about different
ways the user can change preferences. The following are the ways that the user can change
preferences:
1. Changes in preferences/options page,
2. An add-on installed can modify the preferences,
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3. Changes on the page with the URL "about:config," and
4. Changes in preferences through the locally stored preference file “preference.json.”

This thesis had considered only the first factor that is “Changes in
preferences/options page” and discarded the other factors for classification. The reason for
this is an add-on can install silently without the user’s permission and modify preferences.
In some cases, the developer intentionally does not mention changes in the add-on
description. If the user installs these type of add-ons, these add-ons modify the preferences
without the user’s permission.
For the next factor, changes in page "about:config" and to modify preferences on
this page, the user should have some technical knowledge. They need to have knowledge
of the preferences name to search and modify on this page. It is difficult for non-expert
users to change the preferences on this page, so this thesis did not consider this factor.
Browser hijackers can also manipulate the final factor as they can modify the
contents of the locally stored preference file. However, this thesis did not consider the final
factor for classification. In designing the add-on, this thesis considered only the first factor
for differentiating between user changes and non-user changes.
When the add-on detects a change in a preference value, then it will check URL of
the browser active tab. If the page is the options tab, that is the URL starting with
"about:preferences", then the add-on considers the change a user change. Otherwise, the
add-on considers the change a non-user change.
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3.3.4. After Detecting a Change
Whenever there is a change, first the add-on should classify it as either a user
change or a non-user change. If it is a user change, then the add-on needs to consider some
situations based on the time of change. If there was any other add-on installed recently
before the modification, then the add-on will authenticate the changes. The Settings
protection add-on will observe three seconds of time from other add-on installations. If
there is a preference change within that three seconds of time, then the add-on will also
authenticate that change irrespective of the browser’s active tab page. It is not often that
user will modify the preferences within three seconds of installing any add-on themselves.
Clearly explaining, let us assume that the user installed an add-on not related to
preferences. After installing the add-on, the user modified some preferences. There would
be an average time gap between the two operations which would be at least three seconds.
This research estimated this time based on experiments and careful observations. If there
any changes in preferences within this three seconds of time, then the add-on will consider
these changes as non-user changes irrespective of the browser’s active tab page.
If the user enables the self-preference advanced monitoring, then the add-on will
authenticate the change. If there are no such situations at the time of the preference
modification, then the add-on will simply saves the new value of the particular preference
for future references. Figure 3 illustrates this flow of this process.
After detecting a non-user change, the add-on will check its self-preferences to
determine whether to discard or save the new changes and whether to authenticate or not.
If the user enables related “exempt preference monitoring”, then the add-on will save the
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Figure 3. Flowchart After a Change Occurred.
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preferences without the authentication. If the user enables the preference never “save nonuser changes”, then the add-on will discard the new changes. If there are no such related
self-preferences enabled, the add-on will immediately roll back the preference value to the
previously stored value. Now, the add-on will show a pop-up window with the user selected
authentication.
It is the user’s choice whether to save the new changes by passing the authentication
or discard the new changes by clicking the button "cancel." In the case of separate
authentication, the user has three chances to pass the authentication. After failing three
times, the add-on will discard the new changes automatically. If the selected authentication
is master password, then there is no limit on authentication failure times. The only option
the user will have to discard new changes is to click the "Cancel" button in the case of the
master password. If the user wants to know more details about the changes, then they
should click the button "More options & details." The flowchart in Figure 3 explains the
flow of a process in the add-on after detecting a change.
The add-on handles the case where there is a group of changes that occurs at a
single time. The add-on will authenticate only once for all of the preferences modified at
one time. The user can simply save all preference changed at one time with a single
authentication or discard all of the preferences by clicking cancel. By handling this case,
the add-on will not irritate the user with multiple pop-up windows.
When the user clicks the "Cancel" button, a small pop-up will appear showing
“Discarded the new changes.” The following sections describe what will happen when the
user clicks “Forgot password” and “More details & options.”
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3.3.5. Forgot Password
In the case of the master password, if the user forgets the master password, then
they should use the master password reset process. The add-on will discard the current
changes as the user needs to click the “Cancel” button in the authentication’s pop-up. The
add-on has nothing to do with the update of the master password as it is a built in feature
controlled by the browser.

q
Forgot
Password
(only separate
password)

Incorrect
Answers

Security Question
Answers

Cancel
Clicked

Back to
Authentication

Correct
Answers

Select type of
Authentication

Figure 4. Flowchart for Forgot Password.

For the case of separate authentication, the user needs to click the forgot password
button in the authenticate pop-up window. When the user selects separate authentication at
the time of the add-on installation, the add-on will ask the user to select two security
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questions and give answers to them along with password set-up. These security questions
are useful if the user forgets the password. When the user clicks “Forgot Password,” the
add-on will ask them to enter the answers to selected security questions. If the user gives
correct answers, the add-on will discard the preferences changes and ask them to choose
one of the authentication methods.
While in the forgot password pop-up, if the user remembers the password and wants
to go back to authenticate window, then they can click cancel. The flow chart in Figure 4
gives the flow of the process in this step.

3.3.6. More Details & Options
In the authentication window, the add-on will display only the names of the
preferences changed. If the user wants to know more details about the changed preferences,
then they should choose “More details & options.” The first part of this window contains
the name of the preference changed, along with the old and new values. With the help of
these details, users having knowledge about these preferences will know about the changes
happened. If more than one preference changed, this part of the window will display all of
the changed preferences along with the new and old values.
The next part of this window contains the name of preferences changed with check
boxes. Initially, the add-on selects these checkboxes. If the user wants to save only some
of the preferences changed and ignore the remaining, then they should deselect the check
boxes corresponding to the undesired preferences. This part of the window helps to select
only the new changes the user is expecting and desires. This could also protect the user
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from an incorrect description of the add-on. For instance, the "Search and Newtab by
Yahoo" add-on description says it modifies search engine and new tab only, but it also
modifies the homepage URL. In this case, this feature will be handy in avoiding the part
of the changes that the user is not expecting. If the number of changed preferences is one,
then the add-on will not display this section in the pop-window.

More
details &
options

Old and new values of changed
preferences displayed

Deselect some of the
preferences changed (if
more than one are changed)

If the change is from an
Add-on

Disable Add-on

Authentication

Un-install Add-on

Figure 5. Flowchart for More Details & Options.

The final part of this window is to show the source of modifications to the
preferences. It is not possible to tell the exact source of modifications in Mozilla Firefox
through an add-on. If a change has occurred immediately after an add-on installation, then
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there is only a possibility that the add-on changed the preferences. It might not be the source
of modification exactly. This part of the window will display the add-on name and tell the
user it might be the reason for the modification. The user can decide whether the add-on is
familiar or not by its name. If the user installed that add-on, then it will be familiar to them.
If it is not familiar and the user believes it is the source of the modifications, the user has
the chance to disable or uninstall the add-on.
The add-on displays "Disable" and "Uninstall" buttons at the bottom of the pop-up
window. If the user selects disable, then they can re-enable the add-on after knowing more
information about the add-on. In this way, this part of the add-on displays the source of the
modifications though the add-on cannot know the exact source of modification for sure.
The flow chart of Figure 5 gives the flow of the process for this step of the add-on.

3.3.7. Extra Features
The add-on provides additional features through self-preferences. The second
chapter discusses the self-preferences details of an add-on and declaration in detail. As part
of the add-on, some specific extra features and flexibility are available to the user. The user
can enable/disable any of these features only with the selected authentication to restrict
unauthorized access. There is a self-preference to change the authentication method
between master password and separate authentication.
Some users frequently change preference values, and they may change preferences
on their own or through some other way. The add-on will provide users a choice to skip
listening to changes on the particular preference category. For instance, if they do not want
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the add-on to respond to changes of the homepage preference, they have a self-preference
to enable/disable accordingly. For the search engine, new tab URL and homepage URL
separate self-preferences are available for exemption from monitoring. The remaining
preferences fall into the category of preferences for exemptions. Suppose if the user wants
to exempt “Block pop-up preference” from monitoring, then they should enable the
security group of preferences exemption from monitoring.
Another feature available to the user is to lock the options page and open the options
page only with authentication. Enabling this option requires the user to enter their selected
authentication password every time they want to access the options page so that their
friends or children cannot have access to that page. This feature is similar to a parental
control over browser preferences.
Another feature is to discard non-user changes completely. By selecting this option,
the user will not get any notification pop-up if the change is a non-user change. The addon will simply roll back to the old values and discard the new changes.
Another feature is allowing changes from the add-ons downloaded from the official
Mozilla Firefox add-on store. If the user enables this option, whenever there is a change
from an add-on downloaded the from official Mozilla website, then the add-on saves the
new changes without any pop-up.
If the user wants to authenticate every change in preferences including changes
made on the preferences page with the URL starting "about:preferences," then users should
enable the self-preference “Advanced Monitoring.” This feature provides additional
security to the preferences by authenticating every modification. This feature can be useful
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for a public computer where more people are using the computer such as library computers
in universities.
All of these features are available as add-on self-preferences and visible below the
add-on description available on the page with the URL, "about:addons". The user can open
the options page simply by clicking the add-on button in the toolbar. By clicking the addon button in the browser toolbar, the add-on opens the options page in a new tab and the
user can simply access the self-preferences and make changes as per their requirement.
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4.

Evaluation and Analysis of the Add-on

User Interaction of the Add-on
The following pop-ups will appear immediately after the add-on is installed. These
are part of the add-on initialization set-up. If the user is using the master password, then
the pop-up in Figure 6 will appear.

Figure 6. Using the master password Pop-up

In the above figure, if the user clicks "Yes," then the add-on uses the master
password for authentication and with this step the process of add-on initialization will be
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complete, and the add-on begins listening for new changes. If the user clicks "No," then
the pop-up in Figure 8 will open for password entry. If the user is not using the master
password, the pop-up in figure 7 will appear instead of the pop-up in Figure 6. In the Figure
7

pop-up,

if

the

user

decided

to

use

the

master

password,

then

the

"about:preferences/security" page is opened in new tab. In the opened page, the user needs
to set the master password. If a change occurs now and the user still did not set the master
password, then the pop-up in Figure 7 will appear again to select the type of authentication.
If the user selects "No" in the pop-up of Figure 7, then the pop-up in Figure 8 will appear
to set up separate authentication.

Figure 7. The User is Not Using the Master Password

The user needs to enter a password for separate authentication. In this pop-up, the
user needs to enter the same password for both fields. If the users enters different passwords
and clicks "okay," the same pop-up will appear again. If the text in both of the fields is
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non-empty and the same, then the pop-up in Figure 9 will appear. If the user clicks "cancel"
in Figure 8, then the add-on initialization step will start again.

Figure 8. Separate Password Entry

Figure 9. Security Questions
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In the case of separate authentication only, the pop-up in Figure 9 appears, and the
user needs to select the questions and give answers to them. If the user forgets their
password, then the user must provide correct answers to these questions to change the
password or select a new type of authentication. The user should choose different questions
and give different answers. Otherwise, the same pop-up will repeat to select questions and
give answers. If the user clicks "okay" after selecting different questions and giving
different answers, then the process of add-on initialization is complete and the add-on
begins listens for new changes.

Figure 10. Separate Password Authentication
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The pop-up in Figure 10 will appear for separate password authentication when a
change occurred that requires authentication. Installing the add-on "Search and Newtab by
Yahoo" modifies two preferences in the browser. The pop-up contains the names of the
preferences changed. In this pop-up, if the user clicks "okay" with an incorrect password,
then this pop-up will appear again. The user has three chances to enter the correct password,
and after the third incorrect attempt the add-on discards the new changes automatically. If
the user clicks "cancel," the add-on discards the changes. If the user wants to know more
about the changes and other options, then they should click the "More Details and Options"
button. If the user forgets their password, then they should click the "Forgot Password"
button.

Figure 11. Details of Modifications (Master Password Only)

The pop-up in Figure 10 is for separate authentication only. If the user selected
master password as the authentication method, then the pop-up in Figure 11 will appear
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instead of Figure 10. Similar options are available in both Figures 10 and 11. The only
difference is, in the case of master password authentication, the user should click "save
changes" to save the changes. The "Cancel" and "More details & options" buttons will do
the same thing, in both types of authentication. In Figure 11, upon the user clicking "Save
Changes" button, the pop-up in Figure 12 will appear for authentication. After clicking the
"Save changes" button, the user should enter their master password to save the new
changes. If the user clicks "Cancel," then the add-on will discard the new changes. The
process of master password authentication is in two steps rather than one step in the
separate authentication process.

Figure 12. Master Password Authentication

In the case of separate authentication only, if the user clicks "Forgot password" then
the pop-up in Figure 13 will appear. If the answers are incorrect, then the same pop-up
repeats. If the answers are correct, then either the one pop-up in Figure 6 or Figure 7 will
be shown according to whether the user is using the master password or not. If the user
clicks "Cancel," then the add-on displays the pop-up in Figure 10 which is the separate
password authentication panel.
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Figure 13. Security Question Answers

Upon clicking "More options and details," then the pop-up in Figure 14 will appear.
It contains the details of the changes such as preference name and the old and new values
of the changed preferences. If the number of modified preferences is more than one, this
part of the window contains the list of preferences changed with check boxes.
If the user want to discard some of the modified preferences, then they should deselect them and click okay. The add-on then goes back to the authentication panels in either
Figure 10 "Separate Password Authentication" or Figure 11 "Master Password
Authentication."
The remaining part of the pop-up in Figure 14 contains the suspected source of the
preferences modification. In the above pop-up, it mentions “Search and New tab by Yahoo”
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might be the add-on that changed the preferences. If the user clicks “Disable add-on” or
“uninstall add-on” then the add-on performs the corresponding action. Clicking any of
these buttons also discards the new changes.

Figure 14.More Options and Details
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Performance of the Add-on
An add-on means providing additional features and extending the functionality of
the browser. This customization and additional features come at the cost of degrading the
performance of the browser. Clearly, by installing any add-on, the browser performance is
degraded, and the amount of impact depends on the particular add-on. If the add-on is a
heavy add-on with more operations, then the browser performance is more degraded
compared to an add-on which performs fewer operations. Figure 15 displays the memory
used by the add-on. This thesis used the software "about:addons-memory" for obtaining
the results.

Figure 15. Memory Used by the Add-on
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If there are any memory leaks in the add-on, then add-on memory will increase
constantly. The main intention of this analysis is not about how much memory the add-on
is using but for testing memory leaks in the add-on. Using this software, this thesis checked
the add-on for memory leaks and the results show that the memory occupied by the addon is constant without increasing randomly. The memory used by the add-on might change
based on browser start-up or user profile, but it is does not constantly grow. This analysis
demonstrates there are no memory leaks in the add-on.
As part of the add-on performance analysis, this thesis observed the startup time of
the browser several times before and after installing the add-on. There is not much
difference between the results with and without the add-on. The impact on the performance
of the browser due to the add-on is very low and is not very noticeable. This thesis cannot
report the exact results of the startup time because Mozilla Firefox health report only
provides a "startup time graph." This graph plots the average start-up time, and there is no
way to get exact startup time. If exact startup times were available, then it would be easier
to analyze the add-on’s impact on browser start-up time.
This research tested the add-on in the browser nightly for obtaining the performance
results. Mozilla provides the browser nightly for testing new features in Firefox. Another
type of analysis given by Mozilla Firefox over add-ons is the performance of the add-on.
This tool gives the performance of add-ons by showing whether a particular add-on is
working well or slowing down the browser. Figures 16 and 17 are screenshots related to
the performance of the add-on.
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Figure 16 is the screenshot while the add-on is idle, which means the add-on is not
performing any operation in the browser. In Figure 16, it shows that the add-on is working
well with 0% CPU usage and 0% system usage. When there are no changes in preferences,
the add-on will not affect browser performance. If the add-on occupies more CPU cycles,
then it will show “The add-on is slowing down the browser.”

Figure 16. Performance of Idle Add-on
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Figure 17 is the screenshot which shows the performance of the add-on in a case of
a changed preference. In this figure, the results show that both the CPU and system usage
are 1% although it performs well currently. The add-on works when there is a change, at
that time also the impact on the performance of the browser is minimal.

Figure 17. Performance of the Add-on on Preference Change
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With all of these evaluations and test results, the add-on works as expected. The
overall performance is good, and impact on the performance of the browser is low. The
following section discusses different exception cases handled in the add-on.

Evaluation and Results
This thesis tested the add-on in various cases, and it handled most of the exception
cases. This section explains some of the exception cases handled. This thesis tested the
add-on using many other add-ons, which modify one or more preferences and the add-on
detected all of them. The add-on is tested with add-ons that modify preferences search
engine, new tab URL, and homepage URL.
The add-on will work only after detecting changes, so it needs to detect all of the
changes that occur to preferences. The preferences service API will listen for changes to
preferences, irrespective of the reason for the modification, and the reason may be an addon, malware, and adware. Thus, the add-on detects all of the changes to preferences
irrespective of software type.
Some add-ons descriptions do not mention regarding modifications to preferences.
After installing the add-on, a few days later the developer of the add-on may release a new
update in which the new version modifies preferences. In the process of getting approval
of the add-on by the official Mozilla add-on store, the developer will mention the
modifications in the description and then after officially signed, the developer will change
the description such that they no longer mention the modifications that the add-on performs
to preferences. The add-on defended against these types of modifications also.
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For testing purposes, this research developed a dummy add-on and got it signed by
the official add-on store. The researchers of this thesis updated the add-on and released a
new version of the dummy add-on, such that it modifies the preference homepage URL.
The official add-on store signed the new version of the add-on. Later, the researchers
changed the description such that it no longer mentions the homepage preference
modification. The add-on stopped the modification of preference homepage upon updating
the dummy add-on to new version.
Some users observe changes in preferences every time the browser restarts. These
changes may be due to an add-on or malware. In some cases, the add-ons installed may try
to modify preferences every time the browser starts up. Every time the user will modify
the preferences to their desired values, and upon restarting the browser, the user will notice
modifications to the preferences. In this case, if the modified values are different from old
values stored, then the add-on developed in this thesis will discard the new changes for a
small period of time at the browser start-up. The time is three seconds, and it is not possible
for users to change preferences or install a new add-on in such a small period of time.
Simply saying, the proposed solution does not allow non-user changes in the first three
seconds of browser start-up.
The add-on handled situations like unauthorized disabling and uninstalling of the
add-on. Users should go through authentication for disabling and uninstalling the add-on.
In the case of failed authentication, the add-on stops the process of disabling or
uninstalling. This feature will stop unauthorized access to disable and uninstall. In Mozilla
Firefox, an add-on can uninstall other add-ons by searching in the list of add-ons available.
The add-on avoids these types of actions by authenticating the disable/uninstall process.
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This thesis handled runtime exceptions related to authentication. If the user selects
master password as authentication and after the initialization process if the user stops using
the master password, then the add-on will pop-up again asking the user to choose the type
of authentication. If the user closes the browser without completing the add-on installation,
then the add-on will initiate the installation process again at the next time of browser
restarting.
This thesis handles the cases of unexpected browser shutdown while there are
active pop-ups of the add-on. The add-on takes further steps based on the user response
through the pop-ups. If the user closes the browser without responding to the active
authentication pop-up, then the add-on discards the new changes. At the next time of the
browser restarting, the add-on configures the browser with old preference values only.
However, in the case of advanced monitoring if the user closes the browser while
authentication pop-up is active, then the add-on authenticates these modifications at the
next time of browser restarting. The reason is, in this case, the add-on stores changes in the
permanent storage as these modifications might include the user changes.
In the browser, unwanted modifications can occur through any software. The addon classifies these changes as a non-user change based on the active page of the browser.
The add-on will respond to all non-user changes regardless of the kind of software that
caused the changes. The browser modifies the preferences to previous values while
uninstalling or removing the malware, and in this case, the add-on will not respond. If the
user is the one who configured the previous values, there is no need to authenticate the
changes due to uninstalling or removing malware.
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For instance, consider a case in which the user sets Google as the current search
engine in the browser. Now, software X is installed and modifies the search engine to a
different search engine. The browser will revert the value to Google after uninstalling or
removing of the software X. In this case, the user set the value to Google, and there is no
need to authentication for this change.

Approving the Add-on
The developers of this thesis sent the add-on for official Mozilla approval. The
AMO (addons.mozilla.org) team suggested some changes to make the add-on suitable to

Figure 18. Downloads of the Add-on in March, 2017
Adopted from AMO statistics. Image is from:
https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/settings-protection/statistics/downloads/?last=30
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their policy. The developers updated the add-on with suggested changes and sent the addon again for the approval. The AMO team approved the add-on and released it for public
use. Users of the Firefox browser can download the add-on from the web page with the
URL,
“https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/settingsprotection/?src=userprofile,”
and the name of the add-on is “Settings protection.”
Figure 18 presents the number of downloads in last 30 days. This thesis obtains this
image from the AMO statistics of the add-on “Settings Protection.” AMO statistics reveal
that 131 users download the add-on. AMO approved the add-on recently, and feedback
about the add-on is very minimal. The developers will update and release new versions of
the add-on based on user’s feedback in the future.
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5.

Future Recommendations and Summary

Limitations and Future Work
Every solution has some drawbacks and problems it cannot overcome. Similarly,
there are a few limitations in the proposed solution found at the time of analysis. One
limitation is when the user sets a preference to their desired value after an unwanted
modification, and then the malware again modifies the preference. These changes are a
repetitive process, and the user will be unable to set the desired value. With the solution
proposed, users need to interact with the pop-up each time modifications occur and this
leads to multiple pop-ups. Users may be unable to set preferences to their desired values
with these unwanted modifications. The user should reset the total preferences or go
through the difficult process of removing the malware.
The possible solution with an add-on is, consider a case in which a preference is
modified to the same value more than once in a small period of time through non-user
changes. Assume that the user discards these modifications two times. If the malware
modifies the preference to the same value again, then the add-on will discard the
modification automatically without informing the user.
This solution is not an ideal one to this problem because it has some drawbacks. At
one time, the user is not interested in the modification, and later the user may require the
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modifications. The add-on can resolve this problem if it can have the information about the
exact reason for the change and show it to the user. Based on this information, the user has
a choice between saving new changes and dealing with the source of modification.
There are other problems such as redirecting of web pages and adware pop-ups.
This thesis did not deal with these problems, as the proposed solution concentrated on the
hijacking of browser preferences only. Protection against these issues can be part of the
future work to the proposed solution.
Another drawback is exploitation of the proposed solution implemented through
the add-on. The add-on depends on the preferences/options page for classifying a
modification as a user or non-user change. Browser hijackers could try to exploit this
feature and may modify the preferences. The proposed solution can overcome this
drawback if the add-on has information about the exact reason for the change. By knowing
the exact source of a modification, the add-on can easily classify between a user change
and a non-user change and then authenticate if it is a non-user change.
If the browser hijacker knows the design methodology of the add-on, there is a
chance of manipulation and exploitation of the add-on. The major limitation in developing
the proposed solution as an add-on is that it is unable to know the exact reason for the
modification. An add-on does not have any information about the source of modification
in Mozilla Firefox. If this information were available, then it is would be difficult for the
hijackers to exploit or manipulate the proposed solution.
This thesis recommends the browsers Google Firefox and Mozilla Firefox to make
this solution available as a built-in feature. Browsers have exact information about the
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source of a modification so that they can take proper action. This information, along with
the proposed solution, will be an ideal one for the browser hijacking problem. Browsers
can make this feature available and leave the choice to users whether to enable or disable
this feature.

Summary
The main goal of this thesis is to describe a technology to prevent unwanted
changes to browser preferences and provide security to the user internet surfing. The addon provides a user interactive solution to this problem. The add-on can help non-experts,
as it does not require any technical knowledge to use. This thesis focused on protecting the
mainly targeted preferences in browser hijacking such as search engine, homepage URL,
new tab URL, and security preferences. The add-on successfully detected those undesired
modifications of the preferences in a browser that the requirements considered during the
design phase.
The “Settings Protection” add-on is readily available for use in the Mozilla Firefox
browser’s official add-on store and possess key features such as 1) an option to view more
details about new changes, 2) ability to classify user changes and non-user changes
accurately 3) a selection to accept the desired changes from a list of all of the changed
preferences. 4) a description in the pop-up provided specifically when another add-on
caused the modifications to the preference. Also, in the add-on, the user has the ability to
exempt some preferences from monitoring, authenticate of opening preferences page, and
always discard non-user changes.
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The add-on development made use of APIs provided by Mozilla Firefox for addon developers and coded in Javascript, HTML and CSS programming languages. Chapter
4 discussed the performance of the add-on using Mozilla performance tools and the
outcomes proved to be satisfactory. The results in Chapter 4 show that the “Settings
Protection” add-on had no memory leaks, with constat memory storage space occupied.
The total number of downloads of this add-on in the month of March 2017 is 121 which
demonstrates the significance of the “Settings Protection” add-on.
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